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Douglas Cairns (University of Edinburgh) 
 
Summary 
Thumos, cognate with Indo-European words meaning ‘smoke’, is one of a number of terms in 
Greek which associate psychological activity with air and breath. In the Homeric poems, 
thumos is one of a family of terms that are associated with internal psychological process of 
thought, emotion, volition, and motivation. Though the range of the term’s applications in 
Homer is very wide, that range in itself gives us a sense of the unity of cognitive, affective, 
and desiderative processes in Homeric psychology. No post-Homeric author can rival the 
range of the Homeric presentation of thumos, but something of the richness of the Homeric 
conception of thumos as an interrelated set of motivations re-emerges in Plato’s conception of 
the tripartite soul in the Republic and the Phaedrus. Plato’s thumos represents a pared-down 
model of human agency typified by one central desire or aim in life, but also exhibiting 
whatever further capacities of persons are necessary to enable it to pursue that aim in 
interaction with the other elements of the personality. As in Homer, the metaphorical agency 
of Plato’s thumos does not detract from the notion of the individual as the real centre of 
agency. Plato’s conception of thumos, in turn, is a fundamental point of reference for 
Aristotle’s treatment of thumos as a type of desire (orexis). Though Aristotle tends more 
generally to use the term as a synonym for orgê (anger), there are also traces of older 
associations between thumos and qualities such as assertiveness and goodwill towards others. 
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Essay 
Thumos, cognate with Indo-European words meaning ‘smoke’ (including Latin fumus),1 is 
one of a number of terms in Greek which associate psychological activity with air and 
breath.2 One of these is psuchê (conventionally ‘soul’), cognate with words meaning ‘cold’ 
and associated in the Homeric poems especially with the passage from life to death. Thumos, 
by contrast, suggests heat rather than cold: in Plato’s Cratylus (419e) Socrates derives the 
term from thuein (to rage), a verb which not all would associate with the connotation of 
‘smoke’ found in its homophone thuein, to offer burnt sacrifice, or in thumian, to fumigate,3 
but he also glosses it in terms of the ‘boiling’ (zesis) of the psuchê, and zesis is recurrent in 
descriptions of the phenomenology of thumos.4 
 
Homer 
A link between thumos and breath is clear in the Homeric poems: dying warriors breath out 
their thumos on the Iliadic battlefield (4. 522–4, 13. 653–4); the thumos of the dying horse, 
Pedasus, is breathed out and flies off at Iliad 16. 468–9,5 and at 3. 293–4 sacrificial animals 
lie gasping on the ground, short of thumos, after the sacrificial knife has removed their menos 
or vital force.6 In many passages, the thumos leaves or is lost in death (23x Iliad, 6x 
Odyssey), just as the killer (or cause of death) can be said to have removed one’s thumos (25x 
Iliad, 9x Odyssey). Here, the behaviour of the thumos is comparable to that of the psuchê, 
which likewise leaves the body on death or in a death-like swoon, and indeed both thumos 
and psuchê can leave the body together in a single passage, both in death (Il. 11. 334) and in 
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a swoon (as when Sarpedon’s psuchê leaves him and he gasps out his thumos, but is revived 
by a blast of wind, Il. 5. 696–8). In other cases, however, it is the psuchê that is breathed out 
or departs in a swoon, while the thumos is breathed back in,7 which perhaps reflects an 
association of psuchê with the life that one will lose and of thumos with the vigour of life as it 
is lived.8 A straightforward identification of thumos with breath is complicated by its 
assimilation to the heart as something that can ‘beat’ in the chest (Il. 7. 216, 23. 370–1).9 
 The functions of thumos in Homer, however, extend far beyond living and breathing. 
By metonymy (in which aspects of the physical body felt to play a role in mental functioning 
come to serve as ways of referring to those functions) and in various forms of metaphor 
(chiefly reification and personification), Homeric thumos is implicated in a wide range of 
mental functions. But it is not the only such entity: a variety of other parts of the body, 
including the heart (kradiê and êtor) and the phrenes, are also credited with mental functions. 
For an older tradition of scholarship, the existence of these ‘psychic organs’ illustrates the 
primitiveness of Homeric concepts of self and agency. For Bruno Snell, the explanation of 
mental process in terms of the promptings of thumos, other organs, and the gods makes 
Homeric man ‘a battleground of arbitrary forces and uncanny powers’; ‘Homeric man has not 
yet awakened to the fact that he possesses in his own soul the source of his powers’.10 Arthur 
Adkins follows Snell in maintaining that ‘Homeric Man … has a psychology and a 
physiology in which the parts are more evident than the whole’.11  
More recent scholarship has made such approaches untenable. First, it has been 
shown that in a large number of occurrences, when used adverbially (with a preposition, in 
the instrumental dative, or in some other analogous use of an oblique case, e.g. ἐν(ὶ) θυμῷ, 
κατὰ θυμόν, θυμῷ, etc.), the usage of the words denoting the so-called ‘psychic organs’ can 
be less a matter of semantic specificity than of metrical convenience, so that these terms 
exhibit substantial degrees of overlap and redundancy, as in the recurrent pleonasm κατὰ 
φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν (‘in phrên and in thumos’).12 We need to treat the ‘psychic organs’ as 
a family rather than as independent variables. But this does not mean that expressions that 
deploy these terms are wholly devoid of meaning: even at their most interchangeable, these 
locutions tell us something about the character of the experiences involved; in many cases the 
terms in question convey a more substantial and pointed sense of the interiority, intensity, 
and phenomenology of psychological processes.13 Thumos is by far the most common 
member of the group, occurring over 750 times in the poems, roughly twice as often as 
phrên/phrenes. Though its range in Homer is very wide, it gives a sense of the particularity of 
the poems’ representations of the phenomenology of mind and especially of the unity of 
cognitive, affective, and desiderative processes.  
The most basic function of thumos in Homer is to highlight the inwardness of mental 
processes.14 States of mind that are not expressed in behaviour can be said to be ‘hidden in 
the thumos’ (Od. 18. 406–7); just so, Odysseus commands Eurycleia not to cry out in 
celebration of the Suitors’ deaths, but to ‘rejoice in [her] thumos’ (Od. 22. 411), and he 
himself pities Penelope in his thumos, with no visible tears or audible sobs (Od. 19. 209–11). 
Such interiority can also be conveyed by referring to the body language of the personified 
thumos (e.g. its smile, Od. 20. 300–2, its shiver, 23. 215–16).15  
As an instrument, locus, or agent of thought and feeling, the thumos covers a wide 
range of cognitive, affective, desiderative, and motivational states.16 Its motivational force is 
apparent in derivatives such as athumia (despondency, first at Od. 10. 463, frequent in post-
Homeric Greek) and prothumia (eagerness, Il. 2. 588; ditto), and is reflected in numerous 
Homeric passages, especially those in which the thumos is said to urge the agent on or to 
issue commands for the agent to follow. 17 Wishing and wanting regularly take place in or by 
means of the thumos or are predicated of the thumos as personified agent (cf. the post-
Homeric epithumia, desire): there is no functional difference between the two forms of 
expression.18 The thumos is the source of sexual desire (as when Demeter gives in to her 
thumos and has sex with Iasion, Od. 5. 125–7),19 but is also associated with appetites for food 
and drink,20 and with pleasures of all kinds.21 To say ‘restrain your thumos from x’ is to say 
‘resist your desire to do x’ (Od. 20. 266–7). Food and drink restore thumos to the chest (Il. 
10. 460–1), allowing renewed physical effort. It is thumos that allows one to endure,22 though 
it can be worn down by physical exertion (Il. 17. 744–5). That thumos provides the 
psychological component or physical effort is clear from Il. 17. 451, where Zeus places 
menos in both the knees and the thumos of Achilles’ horses. When Achilles wryly observes 
that Aeneas will have no thumos to face him in future, he is saying that he will have (as we 
might say) no stomach to do so (Il. 20. 349–50). 
Often the thumos is associated with especially strong or urgent forms of motivation. 
The thumos itself can be said to be ‘eager’ for a certain outcome.23 In Iliad 24, Priam 
describes his strong desire to enter the Achaean camp and ransom his son’s body as a 
powerful command of menos and thumos (24. 198–9). Hecuba agrees that it is thumos that 
drives him (24. 288–9), but this can also be expressed as a matter of his own strong desire, in 
his thumos, to ransom Hector (24. 236). The agency of the thumos does not detract from the 
agency of the person. The association between menos and thumos as motivating forces is a 
common one (Il. 17. 451 again).24 The verbs μέμονα and μενεαίνω/μενοινάω, to be furiously 
eager, are cognate with menos and often occur in conjunction with thumos.25 This association 
with strong, passionate motivation is present in the phrase, ‘to love someone ἐκ θυμοῦ’, 
which means something like ‘with all one’s heart’ (Il. 9. 343, 486).26 It also suggests that in 
the sole occurrence of the locution ἀπειλήσω τό γε θυμῷ at Il. 15. 212 the threat is especially 
vehement. 
 The association of thumos with motivation and determination is reflected also in 
phrases such as ‘with equal thumos’ or ‘with one thumos’, which connote goal-directed 
striving in pursuit of a common purpose.27 We might say ‘of one mind’, but the Homeric 
phrases remind us that these mental states encompass volition and affect as well as 
intentionality and cognition. In a similar sense, thumos can be the source of what we might 
call ‘spirit’ or ‘character’: in a simile in Iliad 16, the wolves to whom the Myrmidons are 
compared go to drink, after a kill, ‘and the thumos in their breasts is untrembling (162–3).28 
Similarly, it is Priam’s ‘iron thumos’ that gives him the courage to face Achilles (Il. 22. 
357).29 But thumos is responsible for more characteristics than just courage or manliness. The 
thumos of the Suitors, according to Penelope, may be deduced from their outrageous 
behaviour (Od. 4. 694–5), while for Athena at 15. 20 the thumos of a woman is such that, on 
remarriage, she is liable to forget about her deceased husband and his children. A person’s 
typical qualities can also be predicated of his or her thumos, be it excessive, violent, and 
cruel,30 pitiless,31 sceptical,32 or god-fearing.33 Jonathan Shay goes too far in asserting that in 
Homer thumos is ‘a synonym for the English word “character”’,34 but ‘character’ would often 
be a perfectly good translation.  
 In post-Homeric Greek, thumos is a regular word for ‘anger’, sometimes also for its 
dispositional basis (‘spiritedness’), and sometimes for especially vehement forms of anger 
(‘fury’).35 In Homer, it is associated with a much wider range of emotions,36 though anger, in 
all its Homeric forms, does loom large: cholos, kotos (a more persistent, dispositional form), 
and nemesis (righteous indignation) occur in the thumos;37 one can chôesthai in the thumos;38 
and anger terms such as kotos and nemesis can be predicated of the thumos as a personified 
agent.39 In Iliad 2, Odysseus, rallying both leaders and commoners, reminds the former that 
the anger (cholos) of someone such as Agamemnon can be harmful, because the thumos of 
kings is great (195–6) – thumos is the general psychic force of which cholos is a function.40 
On occasion, thumos and anger can come to the same thing: at Il. 1. 191–2, Achilles 
considers whether to kill Agamemnon or ‘put a stop to his cholos and restrain his thumos’. In 
the same way, Achilles’ anger is the focus of Ajax’s appeal in Iliad 9, when he urges him to 
accept compensation, as does the relative of a homicide victim ‘whose kradiê and manly 
thumos are restrained’ (9. 634–9); and Achilles himself concludes his reflections on the evils 
of anger with the resolution to make all this a thing of the past, taming the thumos in his 
breast (18. 112–3).41  
 Vying with anger as thumos’ prototypical emotional association are various forms of 
grief, sorrow, distress, and worry:42 famously, Odysseus in his wanderings suffered many 
pains in his thumos (Od. 1. 4), and similar expressions abound in both poems.43 Another 
substantial cluster of passages associates thumos with fear;44 it is likewise associated with 
similar emotions such as foreboding,45 awe, and respect.46 Similarly, the thumos can (in the 
Odyssey) be the seat of wonder,47 or (in the Iliad) a container for the aidôs (shame, self-
respect) that should prevent warriors slacking in battle (Il. 15. 561, 661). 
As Ajax’s appeal to Achilles in Iliad 9 shows, though the thumos gives rise to anger, 
it can also be associated with anger’s abatement,48 and in fact thumos is regularly found in 
connection with forms of benevolence. Friendly feeling is a recurrent function,49 and one’s 
friends are regularly described or addressed as dear to one’s thumos, bringing joy to the 
thumos, and so on.50 Thus thumos is associated with positive and pleasant emotions that bring 
individuals together, as well as with those that involve an element of pain or create distance 
between people. In a substantial number of passages, thumos is associated with feelings of 
joy and good cheer: the Trojans rejoice, and the thumos in the phrenes of each is melted, as 
they see the eagle of Zeus which bodes well for Priam’s mission to recover Hector’s body (Il. 
24. 320–1).51 Similar is the simile that describes the softening of Menelaus’ thumos, 
following Antilochus’ apology, at Il 23. 597–600: 
 
His thumos melted, like dew on the ears of a crop as it grows, when the fields bristle; 
that’s how the thumos in your phrenes melted, Menelaus. 
 
Similarly affiliative, but potentially more distressing, is the emotion of pity.52 Its 
power and complexity are apparent in Iliad 24 (466–7), where Hermes advises Priam to 
appeal to Achilles on behalf of his father, mother, and son as a means of stirring up his 
thumos. Here, stirring up the thumos involves creating the circumstances in which the 
addressee realizes, on the basis of his own affective familial ties, that another person is 
similarly situated and affected. The physical nature of the arousal that this can entail is 
apparent also in Odysseus’ encounter with his father, Laertes, in Odyssey 24, where the old 
man’s ritual gestures of mourning, prompted by the belief that his son is lost, provide the 
catalyst for the latter’s revelation of his true identity (318–19):  
 
His thumos was stirred, and bitter menos now surged all through his nostrils as he 
beheld his father. 
 
Stirring up the thumos is a general way of referring to this arousal, in connection with a range 
of emotions.53 These passages indicate how thumos can refer to emotions with both powerful 
physical symptoms and substantial interpersonal, social, and cognitive dimensions.  
 Thumos thus stands in a variety of subtle and complex relations to both cognition and 
affectivity. Its association with the impairment of judgement is apparent in cases which 
present atê (disastrous delusion) as one of its experiences:54 atê affects one’s judgement, but 
it also has a strong affective aspect in that it typically involves kinds of arousal that lead one 
to do things one later regrets.55 The thumos can also be enchanted or deceived:56 Od. 18. 
281–3, where Odysseus rejoices as Penelope’s words bewitch the thumos of the Suitors, is a 
good example of how such enchantment works not only on the patients’ intellect, but on their 
desires and emotions. Similarly straddling the cognitive/affective divide, and often equally 
delusionary, is elpis, both when it has the desiderative element that qualifies it to be regarded 
as hope and when it denotes mere expectation.57  
Both hope and expectation require the capacity to think about hypothetical states of 
affairs; the same is true of many of the emotional, desiderative, and motivational applications 
of the term thumos that we have considered so far. But an application to imagination as such 
appears also in a passage such as Od. 20. 92–4, where Odysseus hears his wife’s sobs and – 
in his thumos – imagines her standing beside him and recognizing him for who he is: 
 
Noble Odysseus heard her voice as she wept, and then he pondered, and it seemed to 
him in his thumos (δόκησε δέ οἱ κατὰ θυμὸν) that she had already recognized him and 
was standing by his head. 
 
Again, thumos is the location of an undetectable psychological experience, one that takes 
place within the individual, depends on the body and its powers of perception, encompasses 
an element of desire or longing, and is clearly not without substantial emotional 
implications.58  
 The association of thumos with delusion, deception, wishful thinking, and imagination 
chimes with its function as the object of persuasion.59 Persuasion and its failure depend on 
the appeal that the speech makes to the emotional susceptibility of the recipient, and not just 
on the capacity to advance or accept an argument on ‘purely rational’ terms. Similarly, 
phrases such as φίλον ἔπλετο θυμῷ (4 x Il., 4 x Od.) or κέρδιον ἔπλετο θυμῷ (Od. 20. 304)60 
express forms of choice, preference, and decision that (as a matter of fact, according to 
modern neuroscience) cannot take place without the motivating force of affectivity.61 
Accordingly, in locutions in which knowledge is a function of the thumos we often have an 
element of emotional commitment: at Od. 18. 227–9, Telemachus’ reference to what he 
‘thinks and knows’ in his thumos is not about propositional knowledge at all, but about the 
development of his character,62 especially in moral terms, and his determination to put his 
knowledge of right and wrong into practice:  
 
Mother, I do not resent your anger; but I understand it all in my thumos (θυμῷ νοέω 
καὶ οἶδα ἕκαστα), right and wrong, though before I was immature. 
 
Though ‘knowing x in one’s thumos’ may sometimes mean only that knowledge is an 
internal mental state, there is often a further implication that the knowledge in question is 
something that one should ‘take to heart’ as a matter of conviction.63  
 Since thumos can be associated in various ways with what later Greeks would call 
phantasia (i.e. the imaginative representation of objects, experiences, and scenarios that are 
in principle accessible but not immediately present to the senses, whether in itself or as a 
component in other processes, such as emotion), it is no surprise that it is also associated with 
memory, as when Zeus is reminded κατὰ θυμόν of the fate of Aegisthus at Od. 1. 29 and 
Odysseus remembers Tiresias’ warning to avoid the island of Helios at 12. 266–7. Tiresias’ 
warning ‘falls into’ Odysseus’ thumos, an instance of the recurrent container metaphor that 
makes thumos the place where thinking is done and specific thoughts are located. To have an 
idea is to put or receive an item in one’s thumos. It cannot be denied that in some cases such 
thoughts are primarily a matter of knowledge, belief, or practical reasoning: both Athena-
Mentes and Helen confidently prophesy events as the gods put them in their thumos (Od. 1. 
200–1 = 15. 172–3) and a god’s putting a thought in a person’s thumos is used in explanation 
both of Eurycleia’s recognition of Odysseus and Odysseus’ own knowledge of further trials 
to come (Od. 19. 485 = 23. 260). In the lying tale that the disguised Odysseus tells Eumaeus, 
Odysseus at Troy conceives a plan (noos) ‘in his thumos’ to obtain a cloak for his shivering 
comrade (Od. 14. 490). But it is also striking how rarely the thoughts that the thumos contains 
can be said to be completely free of affective colouring: in the case of Odysseus’ recalling of 
Tiresias’ prophecy (Od. 12. 266–7), the memory is tinged with apprehension and foreboding 
as the lowing of the sun god’s cattle reminds the hero of the dangers of ignoring the warning. 
Similarly, the thoughts ‘in her thumos’ that Antinous attributes to Penelope at Od. 2. 116 
involve her confidence in her skill as a weaver of wiles as well as of textiles, and when 
Penelope herself places her son’s wise words in her thumos (Od. 1. 360-1 = 21. 354–5) the 
process involves the emotional effect that Telemachus’ speeches have on her, both in their 
general impression (she ‘takes them to heart’) and in terms of her amazement (1. 360 = 21. 
354) at his growing assertiveness. Putting a particular notion in one’s thumos can imply hope 
(e.g. Il. 10. 447, 20. 195–6), caution (e.g. Od. 12. 217–18, 15. 27), or aidôs (Il. 15. 561, 565–
6); Antinous᾽ ignorance of his fate, no thought of death in his thumos (Od. 22. 11-12), also 
entails unjustified confidence. Even Nestor’s advice to Antilochus on the need for cunning in 
the chariot race at Il. 23. 313-14 (‘put mêtis in your thumos’) is inflected by its association 
with competitive striving. 
 The pattern is similar when it comes to the association of thumos with planning and 
deliberation. The thumos is the locus of intelligence and problem-solving at Od. 12. 57–8, 
where Circe prefaces her description of the Planktai, Scylla, and Charybdis (55–110) with the 
injunction that Odysseus must figure out a course for himself (αὐτὸς θυμῷ βουλεύειν). 
Eumaeus’ advice to Telemachus, that he should take care, thumos-wise, because there are 
many among the Achaeans who mean him harm (Od.17. 595–6), implies the same capacities 
of intelligence and planning, but encompasses the affective aspect of caution as well. That the 
thumos in such circumstances involves both the mental processing of sensory information 
and the formulation of plans for action in the light of such deliberation is wonderfully clear 
from the passage in Iliad 16 in which Zeus, following the death of his son, Sarpedon, looks 
down on the battlefield and ponders whether to have Hector kill Patroclus immediately or 
only after the latter has achieved further successes (646–55): 
 
He kept looking at them and reflected thumos-wise (φράζετο θυμῷ), pondering 
(μερμηρίζων) hard over the killing of Patroclus, whether … As he was thinking in 
these terms, it seemed better to him (ὧδε δέ οἱ φρονέοντι δοάσσατο κέρδιον εἶναι) 
that Achilles’ goodly squire should push the Trojans and bronze-helmed Hector back 
to the city once more and take the thumos from many. 
 
As Zeus looks, he processes internally (θυμῷ) the information he perceives, but this 
processing also involves the evaluation of present circumstances in the light of a long-term 
plan that is now potentially subject to a degree of modification as a result of Zeus’ emotional 
response to Sarpedon’s death. Thumos regularly has this association with difficult choices 
and the weighing up of alternatives; the forms of intelligence that it encompasses are 
thoroughly tied to action and the affective dimensions of its motivation.64 
 Stuck in the cave of Polyphemus, whose thumos is without pity (Od. 9. 272, 287) and 
who illustrates his readiness to disregard Zeus’ wrath and kill suppliants, should his thumos 
so command (278), by killing and eating two of Odysseus’ companions, Odysseus has at first 
no immediate plan of action: helplessness grips his thumos (295). But once the monster has 
finished his meal, Odysseus’ first thought is of violent revenge: he plans in his proud thumos 
to approach the Cyclops and kill him (9. 299-302). But another thumos restrains him (ἕτερος 
δέ με θυμὸς ἔρυκεν, 302): if he kills Polyphemus, they have no way of getting out of the 
cave. We have seen that thoughts arise or are placed in the thumos and that the personified 
thumos itself can have thoughts and feelings of various different kinds. Thumos also has a 
role in deliberation, often in difficult, emotionally pressing circumstances. Here, however, 
one thumos confronts another. This is not a scandalous proliferation of psychological agents, 
testifying to the absence of a unified concept of the person, but a metonymy: thumos here 
means ‘thought’ or ‘impulse’, not as process (the process in which thumos is normally 
implicated as agent, instrument, or location), but as product. That impulse, however, is also 
personified as the subject of ἔρυκεν. One impulse is more impulsive than the other, but not 
only are the impulse to take revenge and the better judgement that restrains that impulse 
equally ‘a thumos’, but each thumos also has indissoluble cognitive and affective aspects. 
Each evaluates a situation, imagines a possible future, and provides a basis for action. The 
ἕτερος θυμός inhibits a hot-headed, passionate course of action, but as well as prudent, 
longer-term planning, it also involves a projection of future states of affairs that encompasses 
a strong desire to survive.  
 The thumos is implicated in various other ways in the phenomenon of ‘being in two 
minds’. In two passages of the Iliad, following similes that exploit its fundamentally 
metaphorical character by comparing mental disturbance to the action of the winds,65 the 
thumos is itself divided (ἐδαΐζετο θυμὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσσιν Ἀχαιῶν, Il. 9. 8, 15. 629), while at 14. 
20 it is Nestor himself who is divided, thumos-wise (δαϊζόμενος κατὰ θυμὸν διχθάδια). These 
are clearly interchangeable ways of talking about the same phenomenon. Nor is the self-
division that these passages present simply a matter of weighing up alternatives; the division 
of the thumos involves the kind of emotional turmoil that can also be expressed in terms of 
movement, as when Penelope’s ‘thumos is aroused in two ways, this way and that’ (Od. 19. 
524), whether to remain with Telemachus and faithful to her husband or to marry one of the 
Suitors (526–9), or when Philoetius tells the disguised Odysseus of the dilemma that the 
thumos in his chest constantly ‘churns over’ (ἐπιδινεῖται, Od. 20. 217-18), whether to 
abandon Telemachus or to stay and suffer as the Suitors despoil his master’s herds, 218–21). 
The concrete physicality of these metaphors enhances the phenomenological aspect inherent 
in the conceptualization of thumos. But these internal movements also have propositional 
content; the conceptualization of the thumos (by means of metonymy and metaphor) captures 
the intentionality as well as the phenomenality of the mental processes that it explains. 
 In all these passages, the thumos is implicated in deliberation between alternatives, a 
very common scenario in the Homeric representation of mental phenomena. Deliberation is 
something that the thumos itself can do,66 but more often it is something that a person does, 
with or without explicit reference to the thumos.67 At Il. 13. 455–9 it is Deiphobus himself 
who ‘ponders in two ways’, whether to do x or y, before deciding to pursue an instance of 
x:68 
 
Deiphobus pondered in two ways (διάνδιχα μερμήριξεν), whether he should withdraw 
and team up with one of the great-hearted Trojans, or make an attempt on his own. As 
he was considering the matter in this way it seemed better to him (ὧδε δέ οἱ 
φρονέοντι δοάσσατο κέρδιον εἶναι) to go after Aeneas … 
 
Here there is no explicit reference to thumos, phrenes, or the like. This does not mean that we 
should conclude that one can deliberate without using one’s thumos (etc.); merely that 
deliberation is ordinarily an activity carried out by an agent him- or herself, and that, when 
the mode of doing so is specified (via an adverbial phrase involving the thumos), this adds 
little or nothing to the meaning – the adverbial reference to a ‘psychic organ’ merely specifies 
that deliberation is a process that takes place within the mental apparatus of the person. The 
agent owns the process; the reasons for each alternative are the agent’s reasons. What 
reference to the thumos can add (at least sometimes, and especially in circumstances of 
greatest stress or pressure) is a sense of the phenomenology of deliberation as a subjective 
experience. 
 In the passage just considered, the intentionality and propositional content of the 
agent’s deliberations is clear. The same is true when the person deliberates (e.g.) κατὰ φρένα 
καὶ κατὰ θυμόν and when the thumos itself deliberates: there are typically two alternatives, 
expressed in propositional terms (whether to do x or y); sometimes there is also a conclusion 
in the form of a decision to do what ‘seemed better’, which is equally propositional.69 Thus 
the content of deliberation is at least implicitly discursive – it lends itself to formulation in 
terms of speech. Accordingly, at Od. 6. 117–26, Odysseus’ deliberation, on being awoken by 
the sound of Nausicaa and her companions playing ball, is expressed not by indirect 
deliberative questions (whether he should do x or y, how to do z), but by direct speech: 
 
Noble Odysseus woke up. He sat down and began to ponder in his phrên and in his 
thumos, ‘Ah me, who are the people whose land I have come to this time? … But 
come – let me put it to the test myself and see.’ 
 
This passage is followed by a concluding speech formula (ὣς εἰπών, 127), but it is not clear, 
and probably not all that important, whether we are to regard lines 119–26 as silent, internal 
speech, or as spoken out loud. The cases of deliberation that involve indirect questions show 
that deliberation can be silent; those in which the relevant verbs are followed by direct speech 
might be regarded as representing inner thought as silent speech or as using actual speech as 
a convention for representing the contents of the agent’s thoughts.70 The important thing for 
our purposes is that these are clearly the agent’s thoughts.  
 In a subcategory of deliberation scenes, the agent’s deliberation is followed by direct 
speech that is described in the narrator’s speech-introduction formula as an address to the 
thumos. These speeches are attributed either to humans, using the formula ‘vexed, he said to 
his great-hearted thumos’ (7x Iliad, 4x Odyssey), or to gods, with ‘shaking his head he said to 
his thumos’ (2x each poem). As Pelliccia demonstrates, these are all speeches which either 
have no addressee or audience or have no audience and an addressee who is not meant to 
hear.71 The thumos is a sounding-board for the agent’s thoughts, expressed as direct speech; 
the two cases in Odyssey 5 in which the supposed address to the thumos is recapitulated in a 
regular deliberation formula, with the person as subject (‘while he was pondering these things 
in his phrên and in his thumos’), make this especially clear.72 
In a smaller sub-set of these speeches, the speech which the narrator introduces as an 
address to the thumos contains the line ‘But why has my dear thumos said this to me in 
conversation?’73 The question, however, is unanswered; it serves only as the conclusion of 
the ruminations that were introduced by the narrator as an address to the thumos.74 Yet these 
speeches are not addressed to the thumos by their speakers: in fact, they all begin ‘Ah me’ (ὤ 
μοι ἐγώ(ν)). Just as the thumos is not actually addressed, so no actual speech is attributed to 
it: the thumos simply performs two conventional functions, first as sounding board for the 
speaker’s deliberations, then as a convenient scapegoat as source of the rejected alternative.75 
In the longest of these passages, Hector’s monologue in Il. 22. 98–130, it is clear that the 
apparent ‘dialogue’ with the thumos represents Hector’s emotional turmoil (ὀχθήσας, 98) as 
he reflects on the situation he finds himself in: he has ignored Polydamas’ advice to retire 
within the walls (99–103, a reference to 18. 249–313) and so has ruined his people through 
his own recklessness (104) – a self-condemnation that is reflected also in the charges that he 
expects others to level against him (105–7). Hector is fully aware that he will have to answer 
in future for his previous decisions. He then considers his options in the present, 
contemplating an attempt to reach an accommodation with Achilles (111–21). But this, he 
realizes, is a futile fantasy (122-30): 
 
‘But why has my dear thumos said this to me in conversation? If I approach him, he 
won’t pity me or show me respect – he’ll kill me, naked as I am, just like a woman, if 
I remove my armour … Better to join battle as soon as possible: let’s see to which of 
us the Olympian grants the boast of victory.’ 
 
Hector, therefore, addresses himself; blames himself for his previous decisions; weighs his 
options; and comes eventually to a decision that, given his past mistakes and his present 
circumstances, he regards as ‘better’ for him. That he is said by the narrator to speak all these 
words to his thumos, and then rejects a course of action that he himself entertained (sketching 
out what he might do in five first-person verbs and a further two nominative participles) by 
describing it as a proposal of his thumos, in no way detracts from his own sense of agency 
and responsibility, and it should not detract from our sense of him as a responsible human 
agent either. 
 Many of the above points emerge clearly in a highly individual passage of Odyssey 
20. 76 Odysseus lies sleepless in the ante-chamber of his own house, plotting harm for the 
Suitors in his thumos (5), when the laughter of his female servants, who sleep with the 
Suitors, stirs up the thumos in his chest (9): the thumos exhibits its regular associations with 
future planning, silent, internal thought, emotion, and arousal. As is typical, the role of the 
thumos has both intentional and phenomenal aspects – it involves thoughts about events in 
the world and a representation of what it feels like to have those thoughts for the agent. 
Internal, silent, but still emotionally charged deliberation continues, as Odysseus ponders in 
his phrên and in his thumos (10) whether to kill the women on the spot or let them sleep with 
the Suitors one last time (10–13). ‘His heart within him barks’ (κραδίη δέ οἱ ἔνδον ὑλάκτει, 
13), a reference to the anger that disposes him towards an immediate and violent course of 
action: the doings of a physical organ stand in metonymy for the emotional experience with 
which the organ is associated. The organ in this case is the heart, even though it was the 
thumos that was aroused only four lines earlier – the ‘psychic organs’ are a family of terms 
among whom cognitive and affective functions are liberally shared. This is not an experience 
independent of the arousal of the thumos, but another way of referring to that experience, or 
to its intensification. The heart’s reaction also involves metaphor – it barks. That this is 
understood as metaphor, i.e. as a mapping from one domain (animal behaviour) to another 
(psychological experience), is made crystal-clear by the simile that follows – the heart barks 
like a female dog defending her pups (14–16).77 At the same time, these are experiences of 
Odysseus as agent, and the thoughts are his thoughts – the heart barks, but he is the one who 
resents the women’s offences (ὥς ῥα τοῦ ἔνδον ὑλάκτει ἀγαιομένου κακὰ ἔργα, 16). In a 
(unique) variation upon the speech-introduction formula in which a character is said to 
address his thumos, Odysseus is then described as beating his breast and addressing his 
kradiê (17). In an even more striking variation, the ‘psychic organ’ is then – here and here 
alone – actually addressed and spoken to, using second-person verbs (18–21): 
  
‘Endure, heart: you’ve endured worse in the past, on that day when the irresistible 
force, the Cyclops, ate my strong companions. But you endured, until mêtis led you 
out of the cave, though you thought you were going to die.’ 
 
This takes personification of the kradiê further than personification of the thumos is ever 
taken. 78 But still, though the heart is addressed, it does not itself speak. But after Odysseus 
has ‘restrained the dear heart [êtor] in his chest’ (22), the kradiê does obey and endure (23–
4). There appear to be two interlocutors, even if one of them merely listens and obeys. But 
the lines in which Odysseus reminds the kradiê of its past (18–21) show that this is so only 
by means of a poetic conceit. This is clear not only because the experiences of the heart are 
transparently those of Odysseus himself, and not only because the personified mêtis in line 20 
is itself also, like the heart, an avatar of Odysseus, a reference to the way in which he 
outwitted the Cyclops by calling himself Outis and the pun by which this becomes μή τις (~ 
mêtis) at 9. 410. The persistence of Odysseus as operative agent, despite the personification 
of kradiê and mêtis, is also clearly demonstrated by ὀϊόμενον in 21, which betrays the fact 
that all this is Odysseus’ way of addressing himself. The participle agrees in sense with σε, 
the heart, in 20: ‘you’, the heart, endured, and μῆτις led ‘you’ out of the cave, but the thought 
of imminent death is in effect attributed to the only agent on the scene who is capable of 
being qualified by a masculine participle, Odysseus himself.79 The tenor, Odysseus, intrudes 
into the vehicle of the metaphor, in which his own thought processes are represented by 
personifications.80 
 The personification of the barking heart is singular and striking. It emphasizes the 
phenomenology of Odysseus’ experience and conveys it vividly and effectively to the 
audience. It heightens the tension of the situation in which Odysseus is, for a moment, 
tempted to jeopardize his long-term plan by giving way to a powerful impulse for revenge. 
But though its metaphors of self-division dramatize vividly the process of deliberation and 
impulse control, they also leave Odysseus, the real agent, in control throughout. Even though 
it focuses on the kradiê, the passage is also directly informative about the functions of the 
thumos. There is a unity that underpins the shifts – in the passage and in its immediate 
context – between Odysseus, his thumos, and his kradiê. The reflections of Odysseus himself 
in 5 and 9-13 involve thumos in its regular adverbial function (ἐνὶ θυμῷ, 5; κατὰ φρένα καὶ 
κατὰ θυμόν, 10), amplifying, more or less tautologously, the interiority of mental events. The 
thumos is then itself aroused in 9, before this is represented as the indignation of the kradiê in 
13–21. These are stages of a single mental process. Just as there is no functional difference 
between thumos in 9 and kradiê in 13–21, so the address to the kradiê in 18–21 is 
immediately summarized as a rebuke to the êtor in 22.81 The heart, once again called kradiê, 
obeys in the next line, but Odysseus himself tosses and turns, deliberating (μερμηρίζων) how 
to obtain his revenge (28–30). But after Athena appears in the guise of a mortal woman and 
reminds him how close to his goals he is (30–5), the very same process of deliberation is 
attributed to the thumos (37-43):82 
 
‘Yes, all you have said, goddess, is in order; but the thumos in my phrenes ponders 
(μερμηρίζει) this one thing, how I can get my hands on the shameless Suitors, alone 
as I am; they are always together indoors. Besides, there is this yet greater thing I 
ponder (μερμηρίζω) in my phrenes: if I were to kill them, by Zeus’ grace and yours, 
where could I escape to? I bid you think on that.’ 
 
Throughout, the reflections and motivations that this passage represents, whether attributed to 
Odysseus, his thumos, or his kradiê, are those of Odysseus himself; just so, the deliberations 
of the thumos in 38 are assimilated to those of Odysseus himself in 41.83 The thumos 
becomes a ‘psychic organ’ by metonymy; by the ontological metaphor of personification, it is 
then credited with a variety of cognitive and affective functions and occasionally used to 
dramatize situations of deliberation, self-division, and self-control; but these remain ways of 
representing the personal agency of Homeric characters.  
 One thing that is characteristic of the passages that we have considered so far is that 
the various uses of thumos, whether as a personified agent, as a reified container for thoughts 
and emotions, or in locutions which specify modes of thought and emotion, are rarely without 
a sense of the motivational strength of the impulse in question. The impulses that the thumos 
helps represent can be wholly in harmony with the agent’s plans and goals, but the thumos 
may also be in conflict with them. The thumos can be a container for one’s plans or it can be 
the place where overwhelming emotions develop. It itself can be the restraining force that 
subjugates short-term emotional satisfaction to long-term goals, though it is more often a 
force that rational agents need to control. The thumos itself can be divided over what to do, 
but often the agent and the thumos are partners in deliberation. Interaction between the person 
and the thumos is represented in more than one way. The thumos represents a spectrum of 
functions. Nor is it alone in this: the other ‘psychic organs’ also operate across this spectrum. 
But thumos is the dominant, prototypical, and most versatile example among them. In none of 
this is there any reason to question the coherence of the thumos as a concept or to conclude 
that this coherence detracts from that of the Homeric conception of the person as agent. It is 
not that thumos is now affective or irrational in character, and now not; rather it reflects a 
view in which cognition and affectivity are intrinsically linked as aspects of a person’s inner 
life, moral character, and ways of being in the world. As an internal substance, space, entity, 
or agent associated with processes of cognition, affectivity, volition, and motivation, the 
thumos is not a scandalous miscellany of capacities that should be kept separate, but a 
concept that links ‘reason’ and ‘passion’, mind and body, intentional and phenomenal in 
ways that implicitly recognize the unity of cognition and affectivity as functions of an 
organism whose mental functions are fundamentally and thoroughly embodied. 
  
Plato 
The post-Homeric conception of thumos does not have the richness of its Homeric 
counterpart. Homeric idioms survive (e.g. thumos – probably desire or anger – as an 
opponent in a struggle at Heraclitus B 85 DK, echoed in Democritus B 236 DK;84 as an 
agent-like source of motivation in Parmenides B 1. 1 DK; as an addressee in Selbstgespräch, 
Archilochus 128 W), but though it remains associated with desire and with other emotions 
and dispositions,85 its association with anger comes to predominate, all the way to Byzantine 
and modern Greek (though traces of a wider range of senses survive in compounds such as 
the Byzantine enthumizein, to remember, thumoterpês, delighting the heart, etc.). Something 
of the richness of the Homeric conception of thumos as an interrelated set of motivations, 
however, re-emerges in Plato’s conception of the tripartite soul in the Republic and the 
Phaedrus. 
 In the Republic, the division of the psuchê is established by means of the Principle of 
Opposites (436b–c, 436e–437a, 439b), that the same subject cannot do or suffer the same 
thing in the same respect with regard to the same object at the same time: thus when one 
wants to drink, but believes that it is better not to do so, a reasoning part (logos, to logistikon) 
is opposed to appetite (epithumia, to epithumêtikon). Socrates then proceeds to consider 
whether thumos, i.e. that with which we feel anger or rage (θυμούμεθα), is aspect of the 
appetitive element or a third type (eidos) in its own right (439e). The distinctiveness of this 
type is then established by means of examples of its conflict with desire (Leontius’ urge to 
look at corpses, 439e–440a) and with reason (illustrated at 441b–c by Odysseus’ rebuke to 
his kradiê in Odyssey 20).86 The Odyssey passage is so well known that Plato needs to quote 
only a single line (20. 17), for his readers to think of the whole context. In particular, though 
Plato quotes only the rebuke to the kradiê, he clearly takes the passage as evidence for the 
operation of the thumos. He treats the Homeric thumos as part of a wider system.  
The Principle of Opposites can establish that there is more than one type of 
motivation, but it cannot prove that what conflicts with desire, in the case of Leontius, is not 
reason, or that what conflicts with reason, in the case of Odysseus, is not desire. The claim 
that the element opposed to desire in the first case and to reason in the second must be 
thumos relies instead on pre-existing intuitions about the phenomenological character of 
thumos itself. 87 Homer is one source of such intuitions, but the currency, in the ordinary 
Greek of Plato’s day, of thumos as a form of anger makes that emotion even more central in 
Plato’s conception than in Homer’s. Hence thumos is like a boiling liquid in a container 
(440c), 88 but also like an angry dog (440d); the difference between thumos and reason is 
illustrated by the fact that it is present also in furious infants (441a) and barking dogs (441b). 
The Auxiliaries of Kallipolis, Glaucon observes, are like dogs, under the command of the 
Guardians as shepherds of the state (440d).  
But the anger that the thumos entails is not wholly irrational. Though the reference to 
Odysseus’ barking heart (441b-c) is intended to distinguish between ‘that which makes 
calculations about better and worse’ and ‘that which rages without reason’, Odysseus’ 
personified kradiê is not only capable of resenting a wrong, imagining a scenario that would 
right that wrong, and demanding that the wrong be redressed immediately, but is also 
susceptible to argument on the basis of past experience, and is thus credited with memory as 
well as with imagination. Thumos also encompasses the righteous indignation of someone 
who believes he has been treated unfairly, and so can involve a sense of justice (440c–d). 
While at 439e–400a, the anger of Leontius is self-directed, focusing on desires that he feels 
are shameful but is none the less unable to resist; his thumos makes the same judgement of 
his disreputable desires as does his reason (439e–440a). The link between these responses is 
the notion of honour.89 In the later discussion of inferior regimes and character types, 
domination by the thumoeides, manifested in competitiveness and love of honour (philonikia 
and philotimia) characterizes both the timocratic regime (548c) and the corresponding 
individual (549a, 549d–550b). The thumoeides, being philonikon and philotimon, aims at 
power, victory, and reputation (581a–b). As in the Republic (440b, 441a), so in the Phaedrus, 
thumos can be reason’s ally against desire: in that dialogue’s myth of the soul as a charioteer 
and two horses, the good horse is a lover of honour with moderation (sôphrosunê) and 
modesty (aidôs, 253d–e, 254a, 254c, 254e), joining the charioteer in opposing the 
shamelessness (anaideia) of the bad horse (254d).  But alignment of individuals’ attachment 
to ideals of the honourable requires education if it is to support the aims of reason (Resp. 
441a3 441e–442a, 589b). In Kallipolis, this will take the form of traditional education in 
mousikê (441e–442a), which inculcates a sense of what is kalon (beautiful, fine, honourable) 
and aischron (ugly, shameful, 400c–403e), though for the Guardians as opposed to the 
Auxiliaries, the rational faculty will require further education (522a–b). Much about this 
educational regime suggests that it will foster strong and deep-seated commitments to shared 
moral standards (396d–e, 402a, 413e, 429c, 442b–d), even though the sketch of timocratic 
society at 548b does suggest that its members will be tempted, focused on honour as they are, 
to do wrong in secret.90  
 The Principle of Opposites by which tripartition is introduced suggests that the true 
subjects of our desires for the good, the honourable, and the pleasant are the three elements of 
the psuchê (436b–c). For some, this is intended literally, and leaves no room for the agency 
of the person as a whole.91 But from the first appearance of the tripartite model in Book 4 to 
the exuberant accounts of deviant character types in Books 8–9, the language in which the 
tripartite soul is described is fundamentally metaphorical. Thus anger can be at war with the 
desires (440a) and thumos can be reason’s ally, as if they were taking part in civil strife 
against epithumia (440b; cf. 441a). Thumos can be unwilling to be roused when justly 
punished, but fight along with justice, suffering hunger and cold, holding out for victory until 
it either prevails, or dies, or is called back and calmed down, like a dog, by its owner (440c–
d). Plato shows that he is aware of the centrality of metaphor to his account by the way that 
he ends the whole argument on the superiority of justice to injustice, an argument that relies 
on the tripartite model and which runs from Books 2 to 9 of the Republic, with an extravagant 
tour-de-force of metaphor, an image (eikôn) of the soul in words (588b; cf. 588d), that makes 
it a composite of three types (ideai): a many-headed beast, a lion, and a person, with the 
external aspect (or image: eikôn again) of a person (588c–d). This is explicitly an eikôn: it 
tells us not what the soul is, but what it is like.92 The passage is replete with metaphors, many 
of them recalling what has gone before. Thus, when the beast and the lion are strong and the 
human being weak, the latter is at their mercy, unable to reconcile the others but instead 
forced to let them bite, fight, and devour each other (588e-589a). Instead, the human being 
should be as strong as possible, and should, with the lion as his ally, look after the many-
headed beast as a farmer cultivates his crops (589b). The bestial element should be under the 
control of the human and the tame should not be enslaved to the wild (589d), the best element 
of oneself to the worst (ibid.), or the most divine element to the most godless and vile (589e). 
The psuchê is thus a state or politeia in which elements interact like factions or classes of 
citizens (591e). 
The use of personification means that the thumos, like the other two elements, cannot 
be narrowly defined in functional terms: as metaphorical agents they possess many, but not 
all, of the qualities that characterize a person. There is thus no question of deciding what 
capacities they ‘really’ represent or what they can ‘really’ do.93 Plato’s thumos is an entity 
that resembles Homer’s, representing a type of motivation, a pared-down model of human 
agency typified by one central desire or aim in life, but also exhibiting whatever further 
capacities of persons are necessary to enable it to pursue that aim in interaction with the other 
elements of the personality. 94 As in Homer, the metaphorical agency of Plato’s thumos does 
not detract from the notion of the individual as the real centre of agency. When Plato draws 
on the Homeric Odysseus’ rebuke to his heart, he substitutes interaction between thumos and 
reason for the original interaction between a person (Odysseus) and his heart. This might 
suggest that, for Plato, a person and her reason are identical. This, for example, is how some 
scholars explain passages in which not only the three personified elements of the soul 
interact, but the person herself interacts with one or more of those elements.95 But this will 
not work: there are passages that present a relationship between the agent and his logistikon 
that parallels precisely that between a person and his thumos, his epithumêtikon, or the 
desires to which the epithumêtikon gives rise.96 There is a person over and above the 
elements of the tripartite model. The function of that model is to represent, metaphorically, 
the different varieties of motivation to which real persons are subject by presenting them as if 
they too were persons. 
Though part of Plato’s aim in doing this is to construct a working model of human 
motivation, a related aim is the protreptic one of encouraging people to act on the knowledge 
that the model provides by modifying the motivations that it represents.97 We see this 
especially in the image of the triform creature with which the whole discussion concludes in 
Book 9: here, the interaction of the whole person with the three main elements of his or her 
personality is the ultimate point of the argument. At 588e, we are told that anyone who holds 
the mistaken belief that injustice is advantageous and justice disadvantageous is committed to 
the idea that it is better to feed and strengthen the beast and the lion, while starving and 
weakening the human being (588e–589a); i.e. it is our beliefs and our behaviour that 
determine the inter-relationships of our three internal agents. ‘We’ stand in a certain 
relationship not only to our desires, but to each of the three elements of our personality, 
including our inner anthrôpos. The conclusion to this section leaves no doubt that the 
cultivation and management of each of the three elements of the personality is something that 
the individual as such can and should choose to pursue (589d–591e). The ultimate point of 
the tripartite soul is to present an account of the kind of person that we as individuals should 
most aspire to become and of the conditions that conduce to or militate against such an 
outcome. That account presupposes the ability of individuals to order their personalities and 
change their lives. The explicit argument of the dialogue demonstrates that Plato had no 
intention to dispense with the agency of the person; the details of his imagery further 
illustrate the persistence of a fundamental and robust background conception of personal 
agency. Like Homer’s, Plato’s conceptualization of the thumos is fundamentally 
metaphorical,98 but neither Homer’s nor Plato’s conception of the person as a participant in 
intra-personal dialogue with a variety of internal agents leads to the dissolution of the person 
or to a proliferation of autonomous homunculi. 
 
Aristotle 
Aristotle’s concept of the psuchê is a very different one from Plato’s: though he does have his 
own notion of ‘parts of this soul’, he contrasts his biological approach with accounts of the 
psuchê that focus only on human behaviour (DA 402b3–5). For him, the ‘parts of the soul’ 
are logically but not spatially distinct; in the natural sciences, the distinction between them 
depends on capacities that define the differences between plants, animals, and humans as 
living creatures;99 but in dialectical contexts (such as the Ethics, Politics, and Rhetoric), he 
does work with a popular distinction between a part which is alogon and one which ‘has 
logos’, though these, again, may be only logically distinct, like convex and concave in the 
circumference of a circle (EN 1102a26–32). Aristotle is also explicit about the metaphorical 
nature of language that attributes agency to the soul: it is ‘perhaps better nor to say that the 
psuchê feels pity or learns or thinks, but that the person does by means of the psuchê’ (DA 
408b13–15). That said, in dialectical contexts Aristotle is himself not averse to a degree of 
metaphor, and he does seek to accommodate aspects of Plato’s moral psychology, including 
aspects of his account of thumos. 
In his dialectical accounts of human behaviour, Aristotle generally prefers bipartition 
to tripartition. But even when he distinguishes between rational and non-rational forms of 
motivation, he remains clear that speaking of conflict between these, in terms which one 
ordinarily uses of interpersonal interaction, is metaphorical (EN 5, 1138b5–13):  
 
By metaphor and analogy there is a sort of justice, not towards oneself but between 
certain aspects of oneself – not justice in the full sense of the term, but of the sort that 
exists between master and slave or within the household. For it is in these terms that 
the part of the soul that has reason is distinct from the irrational; it is when one looks 
to these parts that injustice towards oneself seems to exist, because in these it is 
possible to undergo an experience that is contrary to their desires; therefore there can 
be a sort of justice between them, as between ruler and subject. 
 
Similarly, though he rejects the Platonic tripartite psuchê, Aristotle retains a threefold 
classification of desire, orexis – as boulêsis (rational desire for the good), thumos, and 
epithumia (desire for the pleasures of food, drink, and sex –  that is clearly inspired by the 
Platonic model of the soul, each element of which, Aristotle himself notes, involves desire 
(DA 432b6–7).100 On occasion, however, Aristotle’s distinction between ‘that which has 
logos’ and the alogon is at odds with the threefold classification – as at Politics 1287a28–32, 
where the rule of law is described as the rule of the divine and the intellect (nous) alone, 
whereas the rule of a human being imports also the bestial, represented by epithumia and 
thumos, which can corrupt even the best rulers; which is why law is nous without orexis.101 
 One major reason for this conception of thumos as a type of desire is the role of desire 
in Aristotle’s account of anger: orgê is a desire to return pain for pain, as the De anima puts it 
(DA 403a30–1),102 or for redress (restoration of honour, timôria), according to the Rhetoric 
(1378a30). Aristotle often uses orgê and thumos interchangeably;103 often, too, it is clear 
from the context that thumos refers to the occurrent emotion of anger (as when thumos is 
included in lists of pathê or otherwise described as a pathos).104 Sometimes, however, there is 
a suspicion that thumos implies something more dispositional than occurrent anger, and on 
occasion it can emerge as more like a trait of character. Thus at Rhet. 1389a9–12, the young 
are thumikoi and oxuthumoi, tend ‘to follow anger (orgê)’, and ‘are overcome by thumos’: 
though thumikos, oxuthumos, and ‘being overcome by thumos’ here are all defined with 
reference to anger and its inability to bear insults or injustice,105 still ‘following anger’ and 
‘being overcome by thumos’ may not be exactly the same thing, and references to youthful 
philotimiai and philonikia suggest something of the positive desire for honour and victory 
that characterized the thumos of Plato’s Republic.  
 The role of thumos in character and temperament has, for Aristotle, physiological 
underpinnings: the natural scientist’s definition of orgê at DA 403a31-b1 – the boiling (zesis) 
of blood and hot stuff around the heart’ – is given by the (pseudo-Aristotelian, but none the 
less Peripatetic) Problemata as a definition of thumos (869a5–6), and the physical 
constitution of bodies that facilitates retention and build-up of heat provides in several 
passages the basis for thumos as a characteristic of both animals and humans, together with 
references to the symptomatology and phenomenology of thumos and similar or contrasting 
phenomena.106 The ‘noble thumos’ that develops in those birds whose bodies are drier and 
leaner (GA 749b33) is clearly not anger as such, but a dispositional trait that might give rise 
to anger. In a passage of Politics 7 (reflecting a form of environmental determinism found in 
sources such as the Hippocratic Airs, Waters, Places) those peoples that inhabit cold regions 
and the periphery of Europe are said to be ‘full of thumos’, but lacking in intellect and skill, 
while Asiatics have intellect and skill, but lack thumos; the Greeks occupy the intermediate 
position, having both thumos and intelligence (Pol. 1327b23–36). Here, thumos may imply 
emotion, but refers to a capacity, like intellect or technical skill: the same diversity obtains 
within Greece (b33–6), some Greek ethnê being characterized by thumos, some by intellect, 
and some being ‘well blended in respect of both these capacities’ (dunameis, b36), 
Characteristic of thumos here is the determination to remain free and independent (b25, 28–9, 
31): ‘in all cases the ruling element and the element that prizes freedom derive from this 
dunamis; for thumos is a ruling and indomitable thing’ (1328a6–7).107 Here, at least, the 
orexis that thumos entails is not merely anger’s desire for retaliation.108 
 The physiological basis for this ethnography is explained in the Problemata: people in 
hot regions are cowardly while those in cold regions are brave, because the bodies of the 
former are loose in texture, so that they lose heat, while the flesh of the latter is denser 
because of their cold environment, with the result that they retain more heat (910a38–b8). 
Accordingly, the ethical treatises identify a natural form of bravery (andreia), found in 
animals as well as humans, and characteristic of barbarians such as the Celts; this resembles 
the true form, but differs because it is rooted in the emotion of thumos rather than in choice of 
the noble for its own sake.109 The association of thumos with the painful emotion of anger 
and its desire for the pleasure of timôria is also to the fore in the discussion (in EN 7) of the 
possibility that there may be a form of akrasia (failure of self-control) with respect to 
thumos:110 akrasia in the strict sense applies only to the appetites (epithumiai) that are 
covered by the moral virtue of sôphrosynê, but analogous phenomena are discernible in 
failure to control one’s anger, a failure that is less reprehensible than akrasia proper. In a 
passage whose use of personification is redolent of Plato, thumos is said to listen to, but to 
mishear the voice of reason (1149a25–6), like servants who rush to carry out a command 
before understanding it or dogs who bark before they know who’s there (a26–9); on account 
of its hot and hasty nature, thumos hears something, but does not recognize it as an order, and 
rushes in pursuit of timôria (a30–2), reasoning that the insult that reason has identified 
requires an immediate response (a32–4). Because thumos follows reason in this way, as 
epithumia does not, akrasia in the strict sense (i.e. with regard to epithumia) is worse than 
akrasia with regard to thumos (1149b1–3). Thumos is also better than epithumia in so far as it 
is spontaneous, whereas epithumia can be devious – ‘the person characterized by thumos is 
not a plotter, nor is thumos’ (b14). 
 Anger is thus more central to Aristotle’s conception of thumos than it is to Homer’s or 
Plato’s, but there are signs that thumos also denotes a capacity with a wider range of 
expressions. In the Eudemian Ethics’ discussion of the virtue of praotês, the mean between 
being too irascible and not irascible enough (EE 1231b5–26), it is clear that this ‘mildness’, 
no less than anger itself, depends on thumos, even though the term thumos is used only with 
reference to the painful emotion on which all these dispositions focus (b6–7, 11, 15).111 This 
is perhaps one explanation for the slightly puzzling sequel to the passage in Politics 7 already 
mentioned. Having discussed thumos as the dunamis that makes nations resist domination by 
others (Pol. 1327b23–36), Aristotle goes on to observe that those whom a lawgiver would 
lead towards virtue should be both intelligent and thumoeideis (1327b36–8). This then 
prompts him to consider the view put forward in Plato’s Republic, that the Auxiliaries should 
be friendly to those they know and savage towards those they don’t (b38–40). This is a view 
that Aristotle rejects (1328a8–16), but the important point for our purposes is that part of his 
argument rests on the claim that thumos is the source of friendliness, indeed the capacity 
(dunamis) by means of which we love our friends and relatives (1327b40-1328a1). This is 
supported by the argument that ‘the thumos is aroused more towards associates and friends 
than towards strangers, if it thinks that it has been slighted’ (1328a1–3). This is a strange 
argument, but behind it may lie not only the considerations adduced by Newman (that dogs 
are thumikos, friendly, and fawning, or that opposite phenomena, such as orgê and philia, 
should be located in the same category),112 or the association between thumos and praotês 
mentioned above, but also longer-standing, traditional associations, such as we find in 
Homer, between thumos and states of mind that we might regard as anger’s opposites, such as 
friendly feeling and the willingness to be reconciled.113 Yet, though thumos in Aristotle may 
imply a disposition for self-assertiveness, manly courage, and competitiveness (on the one 
hand), as well as for gentleness and friendliness (on the other), we have seen nothing that 
would warrant Koziak’s more sweeping claims that the orexis that thumos represents is the 
‘desire … for a good social relationship’ or that thumos is Aristotle’s ‘name for the locus of 
emotional capacity’.114 
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Notes 
1 See Beekes, Robert. Etymological Dictionary of Greek. Leiden: Brill, 2009, 564. 
2 See Onians, Robert Broxton. The Origins of European Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2nd 
edn1954, 44–6, 49–56, 67–79; Bremmer, Jan. The Early Greek Concept of the Soul. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1983, 56; Pelliccia, Hayden. Mind, Body, and Speech in Homer and Pindar. Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1995, 59; Clarke, Michael. Flesh and Spirit in the Songs of Homer. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999, 130–3. 
3 See Chantraine, Pierre. Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue Grecque. Paris: Klincksieck, 1968–80, 446. 
4 Cf. Εur. Hec. 1055, Soph. OC 434, Pl. Resp. 440c, Tim. 70b. 
5 Breathed out: cf. Od. 5. 468; flies off: cf. Od. 10. 163, 19. 454. 
6 For the loss of menos and thumos in death, cf. Il. 8. 368. 
7 Il. 22. 466–75, Od. 24. 345–50. For ‘gathering one’s thumos’ (etc.) as getting one’s breath back, cf. Il. 21. 417, 
Od. 5. 458. 
8 So Clarke, Flesh and Spirit, 140–3. 
9 The thumos is often located in the phrên/phrenes: passages in Jahn, Thomas. Zum Wortfeld ‘Seele-Geist’ in 
der Sprache Homers. Munich: Beck, 1987, 14–15. Some identify these with the lungs (Onians, Origins, 23–43). 
But the anatomical reference is uncertain: see (e.g.) Sullivan, Shirley Darcus. Psychological Activity in Homer: 
A Study of Phrên. Ottowa: Carleton University Press, 1988. 23–9. For the concentric arrangement of the 
‘psychic organs’ within the chest, see Jahn 17–18.  
10 Snell, Bruno. The Discovery of the Mind. Oxford: Blackwell, 1953, 19-22 (quotations pp. 21-2). 
11 Adkins, Arthur. From the Many to the One. London: Constable, 1970, 15-27 (quotation p. 26). Similar views 
are encouraged by the ‘laundry list’ approach to Homeric psychology, in which (in themselves useful) lists of 
different functions are merely set side by side: see especially Caswell, Caroline. A Study of Thumos in Early 
Greek Epic. Leiden: Brill, 1990; Sullivan, Shirley Darcus. Psychological and Ethical Ideas: What Early Greeks 
Say. Leiden: Brill, 1995. 
12 See Jahn ‘Seele-Geist’, esp. 182-211; the table on 186–92 shows at a glance that most of the functions of 
thumos we shall consider below are not functions of thumos alone. For κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν as 
pleonastic, see p. 210.  
13 Jahn, ‘Seele-Geist’, 212-46. 
14 See Jahn, ‘Seele-Geist’, 7–8, 107–8, 210–15, 225–32. 
15 Because phrases such as κατὰ θυμόν/κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν regularly mark internal mental processes, it 
is tempting to regard prayers delivered κατὰ θυμόν as silent (Il. 23. 768–9, Od. 5. 444), as indeed ancient and 
Byzantine scholarship did (Richardson, Nicholas. The Iliad: A Commentary vi. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 1993, 255). This is perhaps complicated by the facts (a) that in the former case the addressee is 
said to hear the prayer (Il. 23. 771) and (b) that in each case the prayer is followed by the formula ‘so he spoke’ 
(Il. 23. 771, Od. 5. 451), but silent prayer (a phenomenon securely attested by Il. 7. 194–5) remains the most 
likely interpretation (see Jahn, ‘Seele-Geist’, 214; Pelliccia, Mind, Body, and Speech, 131–2). For speeches 
addressed to the thumos, see below. 
16 Caswell Thumos, 12–50, 65–76 has a taxonomy, but the schematic representation in Jahn, ‘Seele-Geist’, 20–3, 
is more useful in that besides functions (emotional, rational, and voluntative), it also lists modes of 
representation (as agent, as object, etc.). 
17 References in Caswell, Thumos, 47–9, 73–6; Pelliccia, Mind, Body, and Speech, 55–7, 59, 78, 100–3.  
18 Il. 9. 177 etc. (12x Il.), Od. 1. 275 etc. (9x Od.).  
19 Cf. Il. 3. 139–40, Od 18. 160–1, 212. 
20 (food), Il. 1. 468, 2. 431, Od. 5. 95 etc. (6x Od.); (drink) Il. 4. 263, 7. 320, 9. 177, Od. 3. 395 etc. (6x Od.); 
(both) Il. 23. 56, Od. 7. 184 etc. (5x Od.). 
21 Including sex, Od. 23. 345–6, but also playing the lyre, Il. 9. 189, and a host of others (Il. 15. 98 etc., Od. 1. 
107 etc.). 
22 Il. 5. 670 etc. (5x Il.), Od. 4. 447 etc. (11x Od.). 
23 E.g. Il. 1. 173, 6. 361, 9. 42, 9. 398. 
24 Cf. Il. 16. 529 etc, Od. 1. 320–1 etc. A person’s menos and thumos can stir him to action (Il. 20. 174), just as 
menos and thumos themselves can be stirred up by another’s speech (Ιl. 5. 470 etc., Od. 8. 15).  
25 Il. 5. 135 etc. (6x Il.), Od. 2. 248. 
26 Cf. the more frequent κηρόθι μᾶλλον (2x Il., 7x Od.). 
27 See Il. 13. 487–8 etc. (6x Il.), Od. 3. 127–9; cf. Il. 22. 263 (the thumos of wolves is not of one mind with that 
of lambs). ‘With thumos asunder’ accordingly indicates the absence of common purpose (Il. 20. 32, 21. 386).  
                                               
                                                                                                                                                  
28 At Il. 22. 66–71 Priam imagines his own dogs, restless in thumos, drinking his blood after he has been killed 
in the sack of Troy. 
29 Cf. Od. 2. 314–16, where the growth of Telemachus’ thumos will no longer permit him to sit by and watch as 
the Suitors consume his inheritance. Just so, the disguised Odysseus tells Telemachus that, if he had the youth to 
match his current thumos, he’d soon put a stop to the Suitors’ abuses (16. 99–104). Shortly after, Telemachus 
himself assures his father that his own thumos is up to the task ahead of them (16. 309–10; cf. 24. 511). Cf. also 
such later passages as Soph. El. 26 and Xen. Cyr. 4.2.21, where thumos virtually means ‘courage’. 
30 Il. 15. 94, 18. 262, Od. 15. 212, 23. 97, 23. 230; cf. Il. 23. 610–11 (not violent and cruel). 
31 Od. 9. 272, 287. 
32 Od. 14. 150, 391. 
33 Od. 19. 364. 
34 Shay, Jonathan. ‘Killing Rage: Physis or Nomos – or Both?’ in H. van Wees (ed.), War and Violence in 
Ancient Greece. London: Classical Press of Wales, 33; cf. Sullivan, Psychological and Ethical Ideas, 56–7. 
35 See e.g. Hdt. 1. 137. 1, Eur. Med. 1079, Ar. Vesp. 567, Thuc. 2. 11. 7, Soph. OC 1193, Isoc.12. 81. For the 
distinction between mere anger (orgê), which is natural, and fury or rage (thumos), which is not, see 
Philodemus, De ira, columns XLIII.41–XLVI.14 Indelli. 
36 A list of passages at Caswell, 65–73, discussion at 34–44.  
37 Cholos 8x Il, 1x Od.; kotos 2x Il., 2x Od.; nemesis 2x Il., 2x Od. But NB also cholos and kradiê, Ιl. 9. 646; 
cholos and êtor Il. 10. 107, 14. 367; both, 24. 584–5; cholos and kêr, Il. 21. 136, Od. 9. 480, 17. 458, 18. 387, 
22. 224; cholos and phrenes Il. 16. 61, Od. 6. 147; nemesis and phrenes Il. 13. 122–3; chôesthai and kêr (ὁ δ’ 
ἐχώσατο κηρόθι μᾶλλον) Od. 5. 284, chôesthai and phrenes (Il. 19. 127).  
38 Il. 1. 243–4, 429, 4. 495, 16. 616, 20. 29; cf. kotos and chôesthai at Il. 21. 456–7 and Od. 11. 102–3. At Il. 9. 
462–3, the thumos is the source of Phoenix’s father’s anger (chôesthai). 
39 Kotos in the formula κεκοτηότι θυμῷ (Il. 21. 456, Od. 9. 501, 19. 71, 22. 477); nemesis at Od. 2. 138; cf. also 
‘lest your thumos be indignant (ἐπισκύσσαιτο)’ at Od. 7. 306; ‘but as for those two, their manly hearts were 
angry (ἀγάσσατο)’, Od. 4. 658. 
40 Cf. Onians, Origins, 52, 87. 
41 Repeated verbatim at 19. 65–6, in the context of Achilles’ formal renunciation of his quarrel with 
Agamemnon. Cf. Odysseus’ request that the dead Ajax ‘tame [his] menos and manly thumos’, Od. 11. 562. 
Restraining one’s thumos, however, does not always imply anger; at Od. 11. 105 it involves resisting the 
temptation to eat the cattle of the sun. 
42 Anger and grief overlap in Homer, especially in the form of achos (e.g. Il. 23. 566–7 θυμὸν ἀχεύων as anger, 
22. 53, 242 as grief), but also in other locutions (such as θυμῷ ἀνιάζων, of frustration/annoyance at Il. 21. 270, 
but of lamentation at Od. 22. 88). Cf. Cairns, Douglas. Ethics, ‘Ethology, Terminology: Iliadic Anger and the 
Cross-Cultural Study of Emotion’, in S. M. Braund and G. W. Most (eds) Ancient Anger: Perspectives from 
Homer to Galen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, 29–30. 
43 Grief/anguish/distress, e.g. Il. 3. 97–8 and often, Od. 2. 192–3 and often; sorrow/dismay, Il. 11. 555, 17. 664, 
24. 283, Od. 16. 342; cares (meledêmata/kêdea), Il. 23. 62, Od. 4. 650 and often; mental pain, Il. 5. 400 etc., Od. 
2. 79, 4. 813. 
44 Il. 8. 138 etc. (11x Il.), Od. 7. 50–1 etc. (5x Od.). At Il. 17. 67–9, the advent of fear entails lack of confidence 
in the personified thumos; at 17. 18–23 its confidence entails the absence of fear. 
45 Od. 18. 154, 19. 390; cf. (with thumos as subject) 20. 349. At Od. 10. 374, the phrase κακὰ δ’ ὄσσετο θυμός is 
normally taken to mean ‘my thumos boded ill’ (in the context of Odysseus’ refusal of Circe’s hospitality), but at 
Il. 1. 105 κακ᾽ ὀσσόμενος refers to Agamemnon’s angry, malevolent scowl (cf. 24. 172, where the contrast with 
ἀγαθὰ φρονέουσα in 172 makes it clear that κακὸν ὀσσομένη refers, by metonymy, to ill-will), and so it is not 
impossible that our phrase in Od. 10. 374 is another example of the metaphorical transfer of the outward, 
physical expression of emotion to the undetectable inner experience of the personified thumos; cf. Od. 20. 301-
2, 23. 215–16 cited at n. 15. 
46 For sebas (awe/respect), see Il. 6. 167, 18. 178. 
47 Od. 1. 323 etc. (8x). 
48 E.g. Il. 19. 178, 24. 119, 147, 176, 196. 
49 E.g. in phrases such as φίλα φρονέῃσ’/φρονέουσ’ ἐνὶ θυμῷ, Od. 6. 313, 7. 42, 75 (the opposite at 10. 317). 
50 E.g. κεχαρισμένε θυμῷ at Il. 5. 243 etc., Od. 4. 71; φίλος ἔπλετο θυμῷ at Il. 23. 548; Ἕκτορ ἐμῷ θυμῷ 
πάντων πολὺ φίλτατε παίδων, 24. 748 (cf. Helen at 762); κεχάριστο δὲ θυμῷ, Od. 6. 23; περὶ γάρ μ’ ἐφίλει καὶ 
κήδετο θυμῷ, Od. 14. 146. 
51 Cf. Il. 7. 189 etc. (8x Il.), Od. 1. 311 (14 x Od.). 
52 See Il. 19. 229, 22. 142; Od. 5. 191, 11. 55, 87, 206, 395. 
53 E.g. Il. 24. 568 (anger rooted in grief); Od. 14. 360, 15. 486–7, 17. 150, 21. 86–7 (reminding someone of their 
troubles; see also 19. 117-18). As Od. 18. 160–1 shows the thumos can also be aroused in sexual desire. 
54 Il. 9. 537, 11. 340, Od. 21. 302, 23. 223–4. 
                                                                                                                                                  
55 See Cairns, Douglas. ‘Atê in the Homeric Poems’, Papers of the Langford International Latin Seminar 15 
(2012): 1–52. 
56 Enchanted: Il. 15. 321–2, 594; cf. erotic enchantment at Od. 18. 212; deceived: e.g. Od. 4. 452–3. 
57 Hope: Il. 10. 355 etc. (8x Il.), Od. 20. 328 (3x Od.); expectation: Il. 13. 8 (3x Il.). Od. 3. 275 and 319 are 
ambiguous. 
58 Similarly, at Od. 10. 415–16, Odysseus’ companions are so glad to see him that their thumos imagined that 
they had actually reached their homeland of Ithaca. 
59 See Il. 6. 51 etc. (5x Il.), Od. 7. 258 etc. (5x Od.). 
60 Cf. ὣς γάρ νύ τοι εὔαδε θυμῷ, Od. 16. 28; ἧδε δέ οἱ/μοι κατὰ θυμὸν ἀρίστη φαίνετο βουλή (3x Il., 3x Od.). 
61 See e.g. Damasio, Antonio. Descartes’ Error. New York: Putnam, 1994. 
62 Cf. e.g. Il. 4. 360–1. On the dispositional ‘knowledge’ involved in such passages, see Cairns, Douglas. Aidôs. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, 128–9.  
63 E.g. the strongly emotional affirmation ‘For I know this well κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν that there will be a 
day when holy Ilion, and Priam, and his people are destroyed’ (Agamemnon, Il. 4. 163–5, Hector, 6. 447–9). At 
Od. 22. 372–4, the ‘knowledge’ that the herald, Medon, is to take from his experience of being spared by 
Odysseus and Telemachus (ὄφρα γνῷς κατὰ θυμόν) is clearly a matter of ‘learning his lesson’ in a sense that is 
much more than purely intellectual. Cf. Od. 2. 111–12, 13. 339–40. 
64 Cf. e.g. Od. 16. 235–9, where Odysseus enquires how many Suitors there are, in order that he can ponder in 
his thumos and decide whether he and Telemachus should face them alone or seek reinforcements. Less is at 
stake in Pisistratus’ dilemma in Book 15 – he has only to weigh up his obligations to Telemachus, who does not 
wish to be held up by Nestor’s hospitality, against the risk of offending his father; but still ‘giving thought in his 
thumos’ (202) involves rapid evaluation of possible alternatives before adopting the course of action that ‘seems 
better’(204) in so far as it meets the obligations of friendship (203) and discounts the old man’s θυμὸς ὑπέρβιος 
(212) as something to be dealt with later. 
65 See further Caswell, Thumos, 50–63. 
66 As (e.g.) when Telemachus describes the very dilemma that Penelope will go on to present in terms of the 
‘arousal’ of her thumos (Od. 19. 524) as something that ‘her thumos ponders in two ways’ (Od. 16. 73); cf. 20. 
38, where Odysseus’ thumos ponders how to defeat the Suitors.  
67 With the thumos: see e.g. the variations on the formula μερμήριξε δ’ ἔπειτα κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμὸν (2x 
Il., 4x Od.); other expressions with mermêrizein (Od. 10. 50, 16. 237); variations on the formula ἧος ὃ ταῦθ’ 
ὥρμαινε κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν (4x Il., 4x Od.); other expressions with hormainein (3x Il., Od. 2. 156); cf. 
Caswell, Thumos, 45–7, 73. For passages in which the person simply ‘ponders’, without mention of the thumos 
(or other ‘psychic organ), see Il. 10. 28 etc. Od. 2. 325 etc. In Il. 14. 159–61 and Od. 20. 93 the person does not 
initially deliberate κατὰ θυμόν, but subsequent reference to the thumos suggests (what we might in any case 
suppose) that the involvement of the thumos (or another ‘organ’) can often be assumed; deliberation also makes 
use of the phrenes alone (Il. 2. 3 etc. (4 x Il.), Od. 1. 427 etc. (9x Od.)), and occasionally also of other ‘psychic 
organs’ (êtor, Il. 1. 188–9, kêr, Od. 7. 82–3, 18. 344–5, 23. 85–6). See Jahn, ‘Seele-Geist’, 273–85, 291–3. 
68 For the same pattern, cf. Od. 6. 141–6, 18. 90–4. 
69 The relevant formulae are used both in cases in which the agent deliberates whether to do x or y and where 
the issue is how to do x; on these, see Pelliccia, Mind, Body, and Speech, 126–7. Here we concentrate on the 
former. 
70 For the issues here, see Pelliccia, Mind, Body, and Speech, 128–35, 182–99. 
71 Pelliccia, Mind, Body, and Speech, 121–3, 136–46, 200–3, 212–13, and passim; cf. Gill, Christopher. 
Personality in Greek Epic, Tragedy, and Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, 58, 187. 
72 Od. 5. 365 (picking up 355) and 424 (picking up 407). For Sullivan, on the other hand (Psychological and 
Ethical Ideas, 58, 69), it is addresses to the thumos above all that ‘emphasize the distinctness of person and 
thumos’. 
73 Il. 11. 407, 17. 97, 21. 562, 22. 122: ἀλλὰ τίη μοι ταῦτα φίλος διελέξατο θυμός; 
74 Cf. the sole occurrence of the phrase in a speech that is not so introduced, at Il. 22. 385 (with Pelliccia [] 205). 
75 See Pelliccia, Mind, Body, and Speech, 203–11, 267. On the ‘self-distancing’ that this represents, cf. Gill, 
Personality, 187–8. 
76 Cf. Halliwell, Stephen. ‘Traditional Greek Conceptions of Character’, in C. B. R. Pelling (ed.), 
Characterization and Individuality in Greek Literature. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990, 38–42; 
Pelliccia, Mind, Body, and Speech, 175–8, 220-4; Gill, Personality, 183–90. 
77 A conscious and knowing approach to the use of such imagery is also suggested by the pun, κύντερον (‘more 
dog-like’, i.e. worse), in 18. Cf. Od. 19. 204–7: in a common metaphor for grief, love, etc., Penelope’s cheeks 
‘melt’ (τήκετο, 204, 208) in a way that is compared to melting snow on a mountain (205–7). The amplification 
by means of a simile indicates deliberate, artistic use of metaphorical concepts. 
78 See Pelliccia, Mind, Body, and Speech, 175–6, 178; Gill, Personality, 184. 
                                                                                                                                                  
79 As Eustathius acutely noted (Comm. Od. 2. 223 Stallbaum on 20. 18). Cf. Halliwell, ‘Character’, 40 n. 9; 
Pelliccia, Mind, Body, and Speech, 223 n. 203. 
80 For ‘intrusion’, see Silk, Michael. Interaction in Poetic Imagery. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1974, 138–49 and passim. 
81 Cf. Pelliccia, Mind, Body, and Speech, 177 n. 123, with Jahn, ‘Seele-Geist’, 201–9, on Austauschbarkeit. 
Similarly, κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν forms a single adverbial expression, pleonastically modifying μερμήριζε 
in 10.  
82 Thus the passage combines two conventional objects of deliberation, whether to do x or y and how to do what 
one has decided to do; see Pelliccia, Mind, Body, and Speech, 220-3; Gill, Personality, 184. 
83 See Pelliccia, Mind, Body, and Speech, 222. 
84 Cf. Arist. Pol. 1315a27–31 (and again at EE 1223b22–4, EN 1105a8). 
85 Courage/manliness: Tyrt. 10. 17 W, Call. 1. 1 W, Pi. N. 3. 58; grief/sorrow: Thgn. 1029–36, Bacchyl. 1. 179, 
Pi. I. 8. 52, Emped. B 145 DK; joy: Sem. 7. 70 W, Pi. O. 7. 43, I. 7. 2, Bacchyl. 3. 83–4; character in general: 
Pi. N. 7. 10, 11. 32, Bacchyl. 17. 82. 
86 On the Homeric inspiration for the role of the thumos in the Republic, see Pelliccia, Mind, Body, and Speech, 
28–9 n. 38; Gill, Personality, 184, 188, 253; Renaut, Olivier. Platon: La mediation des émotions. Paris: Vrin, 
2014, passim, esp. 121–34. 
87 See Annas, Julia. An Introduction to Plato’s Republic. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981, 127–9, 137–
41; Price, Anthony W. Mental Conflict. London: Routledge, 1995. 56–7, 61–3, 68–70. 
88 On zesis, boiling, as a thumos-metaphor, see n. 4.  
89 Cairns, Aidôs, 381–92. 
90 Cf. Cairns, Aidôs, 387–9. 
91 Bobonich, Christopher. Plato’s Utopia Recast. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, esp. 217–22, 248–51. 
For Bobonich (p. 228), ‘Plato’s commitment to agent-like parts of the soul pervades the Republic and he never 
suggests that such talk is intended as a metaphor or as a convenient way of speaking and not as a literal truth 
claim.’ 
92 Cf. Phdr. 246a, 256b–c on the chariot myth.  
93 As do Lorenz, Hendrik. The Brute Within: Appetitive Desire in Plato and Aristotle. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006, 2, 16, 34, 48–9; Moss, Jessica. ‘Appearances and Calculations: Plato’s Division of the 
Soul.’ Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 34 (2008): 35–68.  
94 See Moline, Jon. ‘Plato on the Complexity of the Psyche.’ Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 60 (1978): 
1-26; Annas, An Introduction, 131, 142–6; Cooper, John. ‘Plato’s Theory of Human Motivation.’ History of 
Phililosophy Quarterly 1 (1984): 3–21.  
95 See e.g. 443d-e, 550a-b, 553b-d, 571d-572a, 591e, 606a, with Irwin, Terence Plato’s Ethics. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995, 285–7. For Bobonich, Plato’s Utopia Recast, 234 and n. 27, these are simply cases of 
‘occasional loose language’. 
96 See 553d, 571d, 588e-589b, 589d.  
97 See Kamtekar, Rachana. ‘Speaking with the Same Voice as Reason: Personification in Plato’s Psychology.’ 
Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 31 (2006): 167-202. 
98 Cf. Schofield, Malcolm. Plato. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, 280 n. 48: ‘I conclude that Plato – 
always the dramatist of the theatre of the soul – has no non-metaphorical way of articulating his theory of mind.’ 
Cf. 281 n. 59. 
99 See DA 402b1–10, 411a26–b30, 413b11–16, 29–414a3, 432a22–b7, 433b1–4, with Vander Waerdt, Paul. 
‘Aristotle’s Criticism of Soul-Division.’ American Journal of Philology 108 (1987): 637–43; Whiting, Jennifer. 
‘Locomotive Soul: The Parts of Soul in Aristotle’s Scientific Works.’ Οxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 22 
(2002): 141–200; Corcilius, Klaus and Gregoric, Pavel. ‘Separability vs Difference: Parts and Capacities of the 
Soul in Aristotle.’ Οxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 39 (2010): 81–120; Johansen, Thomas. The Powers of 
Aristotle’s Soul. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, 47–72, 247–51; Shields, Christopher. Aristotle: De 
Anima. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, 88–9, 161–2, 185–8, 191–2, 349, 361–2]. 
100100 See DA 414b2, De Motu 700b22, EE 1223a26–7, 1225b25, EN 1111b10–13, Rhet. 1369a2–7; cf. De sensu 
436a6–11, MM 1187b36–7; cf. Polansky, Ronald. Aristotle’s De Anima: A Commentary, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007, 502–5; Shields, De Anima, 350.  
101 Cf. 1334b15–28, with Kraut, Richard. Aristotle: Politics Books VII and VIII. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1997, 147–8; cf. e.g. Probl. 956b35–6. 
102 Cf. Top. 156a31–b4, 127b31–3. 
103 E.g. EN 1126a16, 19–21, 1135b25–7, Rhet. 1369b11–12, 1370b9–14, 1378b2–6, 1379a4. At Rhet. 1373b36 
Aristotle promises a discussion of thumos ‘in the account of the pathê’; when that account comes, the term used 
is orgê (1378a30ff.) 
104 DA 403a16–18 (cf. 403b18), EE 1220b11–12; cf. EN 1117a9, 1147a14–17 EE 1220a21. 
                                                                                                                                                  
105 By contrast the old at 1390a11–12 are prone to sharp but less intense outbursts of thumos, while those in 
their prime are moderate in both thumos and epithumia (1390b2–4). 
106 See HA 588a23, PA 650b34–6, 651a1–2, Probl. 889a15–25, 898a4–8, 910a38–b8, 923a9–12, 947b23–
948a12, 954a31–4. 
107 The phrase ‘thumos is an indomitable thing’ occurs also at EE 1229a28 (see n. 109). At EE 1222b4 the 
deficiency that makes one too ready to come to terms and reconcile is said to be rare, because ‘thumos is not a 
sycophantic thing’. Cf. the thumos that characterizes men rather than women at Physiog. 809a36–7. It is their 
thumoeidic and warlike character that makes it unlikely, according to Aristotle, that Plato’s Auxiliaries would 
have acquiesced in being ruled, but never ruling (Pol. 1264b8–10). 
108 This it is not quite right to say that, for Aristotle, thumos, unlike boulêsis and epithumia, ‘seems to be 
explicable only with reference to a past event’ (Nussbaum, Martha. Aristotle’s De Motu Animalium. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1978 336). 
109 See 1229a20–9, 1229b28–32, EN 1116b23–1117a9. 
110 EN 1145b19–20, 1147a14–17, 1147b29–34, 1148b10–14, 1149a24–b27; see Natali, Carlo. ‘Nicomachean 
Ethics VII. 5–6: Beastliness, Irascibility, and Akrasia’ in C. Natali (ed.), Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Book 
VII. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, 103–29. 
111 The equivalent discussion in EN mostly uses orgê (EN 1125b26, 30–1, 1126a3–4, 6–7, 13–20, 22, 1126b5–6, 
10), but has thumos as a synonym at 1126a20–1. 
112 HA 488b21–2 and Top. 113a33–b3 resp.; see Newman, William L. The Politics of Aristotle. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1887, iii. 367. 
113 For the former, see (e.g.) passages in which the friend is addressed as ‘you who delight my thumos’ (Il. 5. 
243, Od. 4. 71, etc.) or those in which friendly feeling itself is a function of the thumos (Od. 6. 313, 7. 42, 14. 
146); for the latter, see (e.g.) Il. 19. 178 (‘let your thumos be reconciled’). Cf. the ‘softening’ of Achilles’ 
thumos by gifts at Il. 24. 119, 147, 176, 196.  
114 Koziak, Barbara. Retrieving Political Emotion: Thumos, Aristotle, and Gender. University Park PA: Penn 
State Press, 2000 (quotations from pp. 96, 111). 
